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The smart city and its publics: insights from across six UK cities
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France
In response to policy-makers’ increasing claims to prioritise ‘people’ in smart city
development, we explore the publicness of emerging practices across six UK cities:
Bristol, Glasgow, London, Manchester, Milton Keynes, and Peterborough. Local
smart city programmes are analysed as techno-public assemblages invoking varie-
gated modalities of publicness. Our findings challenge the dystopian speculative
critiques of the smart city, while nevertheless indicating the dominance of ‘entrepre-
neurial’ and ‘service user’ modes of the public. We highlight the risk of bifurcation
within smart city assemblages, such that the ‘civic’ and ‘political’ roles of the public
become siloed into less obdurate strands of programmatic activity.
Keywords: smart cities; future cities; UK; assemblage theory; public; publicness
1. Introduction
The growing body of academic commentary which the smart city has attracted in recent years
(De Jong et al. 2015) has often suggested that its envisionment takes insufficient account of
social and political questions (see e.g. Greenfield 2013; Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser
2014; Calzada and Cobo 2015; Hollands 2015). In parallel, the concept has met with less than
universal approval in the broader public realm: in a review of popular cultural products, Vanolo
(2016) has sketched out a series of ‘smart city imaginaries’, in which citizens are variously
absent, excluded, or subjugated. But as smart concepts are gradually being translated into
locally embedded policies and practices in many countries, the question arises of whether the
earlier, speculative critiques of the smart city, and its rather dystopian popular imaginaries,
remain relevant. The present research begins instead from the observation that contemporary
policies appear consciously to have adopted an language of aspirational claims which chime
with calls for smart cities to bemore ‘citizen focused’ or ‘people-centred’ (Saunders and Baeck
2015). Whether these claims respond to its sceptical earlier reception or are the outcome of its
accommodation within local policy processes, they suggest that the smart city has entered a
new phase, as it takes shape in particular places, and about which we currently have relatively
little empirical understanding (Kitchin 2015, 132).
The shift in smart city rhetoric is apparent in various recent national policies and
initiatives. On its home page, the Indian Smart Cities Challenge website prominently
claims that ‘Good governance is putting people at the centre of the development process’
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(Smart Cities Challenge 2016). For Smart Nation Singapore, the hope is that ‘people are
empowered by technology to lead meaningful and fulfilled lives. . . . A Smart Nation is
built not by government, but by all of us’ (Smart Nation 2016). And the UK’s new smart
city standards assert that ‘the key challenge around smart cities is not technological but
about people’ (BSI 2015, 10) and that ‘For the citizen, the benefits of this integration of
city systems include. . .an increased sense of democratic participation’ (7). Indeed, the
present research focuses on the United Kingdom because ‘smart city’ discourse appears
to be having a widespread influence on its local policy-making. A recent survey (Caprotti
et al. 2016) found just under a third of UK local authority areas with populations of over
100,000 to have a clear smart city ambition and/or substantial-related initiatives taking
place, and local programmes of activity are imbued with rhetoric implicitly countering
the charge of the smart city being a technocratic imposition. Glasgow, for example, is
‘putting people at the heart of its future’ and ‘involving and empowering communities’
(Future City Glasgow 2016a); Manchester’s Smarter City Programme aims ‘to achieve
better outcomes for the city and its citizens’ (Manchester City Council 2016); the Smart
London Plan places ‘Londoners at the core’ (GLA 2016); Bristol’s vision of an ‘Open
Programmable City’ involves ‘giving citizens more ability to interact, work, and play
with their city’ (Bristol is Open 2016a).
The current phase in the (UK) smart city’s development, then, marks a confluence of
earlier normative visions with the agency of local actors and agendas. In response to the
common claims to be putting ‘the people’ or ‘citizens’ at the heart of the resulting
activities, the present research explores the variegated ways that smart city programmes
are attempting to mobilise ‘publicness’, conceptually, rhetorically, or practically. Based
on the present study, we propose four modalities of publicness – which we label the
‘service-user’, ‘entrepreneurial’, ‘political’, and ‘civic’ – and understand these as emer-
ging from particular ‘techno-public assemblages’ of issues, people, practices, and space.
Through this framework, we explore two broad questions: What types of publicness are
envisaged and enacted through recent UK smart city policy initiatives? and What is the
particular role of digital urban technology deployed through the smart city in shaping
and recasting the public in novel ways? In extension of the latter, we also open the
following question to debate: What spatial (re-)configurations of publicness are envi-
sioned by and enacted through smart city policy?
The article begins by introducing the concept of the techno-public assemblage, as
a framework for analysing the smart city as it transitions from policy into practice.
After then explaining the rationale for the choice of the six UK cities, and the
approach taken to analysis, the article explores the characteristics of their smart
city activities from the perspective of each modality of publicness in turn. This
analysis draws out broad patterns in the relative prevalence of each modality across
the six cities and the forms of the assemblage through which each emerges. Based on
this evidence, the article then draws a series of conclusions about current successes
and failures in developing a more ‘public’ smart city and possible reasons for these.
2. The smart city as techno-public assemblage
Like other grand urban visions, smart city concepts have to ‘negotiate with the
spatiality and the geography of place’ (Harvey 2000, 179–180) as they are translated
into individual political, economic, and social contexts. As a globally ‘mobile’,
though ill-defined, body of urban policy (Crivello 2015), the smart city is likely to
2 R. Cowley et al.
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be selectively adopted and reworked as it becomes embedded in local governance
networks and pre-existing strategic concerns (Peck and Theodore 2001, 2010; Prince
2010). These processes increasingly provide the opportunity to analyse smart cities as
situated bodies of practices, into which human actors are differently enrolled. Rather
than understanding the smart city as a given set of technologies whose promoters
(problematically) assume certain deterministic effects on society, this article construes
the smart city as contingently shaped both by local factors and by broader (policy)
discourses. To develop a grounded understanding of the varying implications for the
‘public city’ when different technologies are labelled as smart, implemented by
combinations of local actors in response to varied agendas, and enacted in particular
ways in particular spaces, we propose that smart city initiatives may be usefully
theorised as techno-public assemblages.
In understanding these contingent (and shifting) local manifestations as giving
rise to various modalities of publicness, we take direct inspiration from Newman and
Clarke’s (2009) notion of ‘assemblages of publicness’. These authors draw attention
to ways that ‘people. . ., policies, discourses, texts, technologies and techniques, sites
or locations’ and ‘forms of power or authority’ (24) become articulated in particular
cases. They highlight ‘the creative and dynamic ways in which actors seek out,
interpret, and enrol ideas in new settings. . . in which ideas are received, translated,
mediated, and adapted into the new practices’ (20). Accordingly, we analyse smart
city assemblages as shaped by multiple inter-related agencies rather than as only
imposed by state or corporate actors from ‘above’. We note, further, Kitchin’s (2014)
recent elaboration of the idea of ‘socio-technical assemblages’ of big data, referring
to smart city infrastructure among other things, which draws on attempts to capture
the open-ended, multiple, relational, and dynamic qualities of urban phenomena
through the lens of assemblage theory (e.g. Farías and Bender 2010; Farías 2011;
McFarlane 2011a, 2011b). In relating particular activities to each other and to city-
level strategies, we follow Buchanan (2015), nevertheless, in understanding assem-
blages as ‘purposeful. . . not simply a happenstance collocation of people, materials
and actions, but the deliberate realisation of a distinctive plan’ (385). The smart
techno-public assemblages presented in this paper, then, are neither fixed nor fully
fluid, but rather ‘working arrangements’ (383) which both derive from multiple
deliberate processes of formation and are subject to ongoing stabilising and destabi-
lising influences.
Our notion of ‘publicness’ is aligned with the long-term shift away from theoris-
ing the public as a singular whole or as expressing the common good, towards
thinking in terms of a ‘heterogeneous public’ (Young 1989), or the co-existence of
multiple ‘publics’ (see, most notably, Fraser 1990), whether interpellated by different
media (see e.g. Warner 2002) or emerging around issues (see e.g. Marres 2005). It
also reflects Mahony’s (2013) observation that the policy goal of ‘public engagement’
is informed variously by quite different perspectives on the public. Alongside its
modernist sense as a representable ‘real and pre-existing entity’ (352), the ‘public’
may be conceptualised as a normative democratic ideal or as an emergent phenom-
enon. From a different angle, Barnett (2014), relatedly, observes that ‘public values’
often describe ‘distributed whole fields of practices and relationships’ (8). We con-
ceive of the publicness of the smart city, then, as variously invoked and performed
through the place-specific articulation of different goals, technologies, material
spaces, and institutional settings.
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The idea that publicness is assembled through new digital urban technologies also allows
us to explore the implications of the differentiated obduracy (Hommels 2005, 2010) of what
results. Although the field of the smart city may be in flux, its related infrastructural
innovations in particular are likely to become relatively fixed (Hommels 2010) – even if
their significance changes over time, as they ‘come to be related to new entities and react to
them’ (Ureta 2014, 245). We are therefore alert to the possibility that certain forms of
assemblages may come to form ‘stabilised networks’ constituting ‘potential actant[s] in a
subsequent phase of urban development’ (Bender 2010, 310). Equally, the resulting norms of
publicness may become ‘sedimented’ (Newman and Clarke 2009) into more permanent
institutional processes. Conversely, those elements of the assemblages which are more
ephemeral and fragile – as Newman and Clarke (2009) characterise many assemblages of
publicness –may seem less well placed to have ongoing influence on the production of urban
space.
Assessing the likely obduracy of these varied assemblages also potentially allows
analysis to encompass more ‘emergent’ forms of public counter-discourse. It is precisely
the obduracy of both infrastructures and regulatory institutions (as ‘sedimented’ sites of
norms) which, in the Dewey (1989) tradition, lead to frictions and frustrations in times of
rapid technological change. This raises the important question of whether the smart city
adequately accounts for the possibility of public non-compliance or resistance. Whether, that
is, it envisions – or even serves to suppress – the political multiplicity of civil society in the
‘real’ city. Conceptualisations of civil society only as a ‘domain that needs to be constructed
and tutored (by governments and international organisations)’ (Newman and Clarke 2009,
58) may problematically ignore its more unruly, but potentially constructive, role as ‘the
organic condition of society that provides the springboard for economic and social develop-
ment’ (58).
Here, the scope of Newman and Clarke’s discussion of publicness is extended in two
ways. First, we focus more directly on the impact of digital technology on its assemblage;
relatedly, Barns (2016) has recently called for further understanding of what ‘digital urban
publics’ might comprise. Second, we wish to initiate a discussion about the distinctive
spatialities of smart city initiatives. While citizenship theory tends not to focus on questions
of space, this goal seems germane within an investigation of the variegated publicness
potentially generated by smart city initiatives as interventions in real (and virtual) urban
space.
To make sense of the variegated publicness thus invoked, we conceive of it displaying
four distinct modalities: the service user, entrepreneurial, civic, and political – each of which
are discussed in the main findings section of this article. This novel four-way conceptualisa-
tion was derived, on one hand, from political theory perspectives on the public, and in
particular Newman & Clarke’s (2009) aforementioned theorisation of new heterogenous
forms of publicness, which not only distinguishes between political and civic publics, but
also draws attention to the emergence of new uneven market- and consumer-based sites and
practices of publicness. On the other, it was derived from a grounded analysis of contempo-
ary smart city initiatives identified in an earlier broader survey of 34 UK cities (Caprotti et al.
2016). This empirical material highlighted the varied ways in which the public was explicitly
or implicitly positioned in relation to smart city strategies and activities. Altogether, these
theoretical and empirical observations resulted in the four distinct heuristic categories
presented here. The categorisation was further corroborated by the growing literature
which highlights the entrepreneurial aspects of smart city governance (e.g. Caragliu, Del
Bo, and Nijkamp 2011; Wiig 2015; Evans, Karvonen, and Raven 2016; Krivý 2016) or
4 R. Cowley et al.
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suggests that smart city visions of technology-driven innovation in service provision have
not convincingly accounted for the social and political dimensions of urban life (see
Introduction).
3. Methodology
This research focuses on evidence drawn from six UK cities: Bristol, Glasgow, London,
Manchester, Milton Keynes, and Peterborough. The units of our comparative analysis are not
these cities in a broader sense (Robinson 2011) – defined, for example, by municipal
boundaries – but rather their smart city (policy) activity at the point of local implementation.
Our choice does not imply that we advocate these cities as exemplars of ‘best practice’, but
rather reflects in each case the emergence of a relatively wide range of activities through
policy-making explicitly drawing on smart city discourse. We treat these cases as important
‘nodal points’ within wider flows of concepts and policy discourses (15) and have included
six – rather than focusing on, say, one city in particular – in order to capture a sufficient
diversity of institutional and municipal contexts through which local policies are being
applied, precisely since we are interested in the variety evident among programmes of
activities taking shape within different local contexts.
The six cities were selected following an earlier analysis (Caprotti et al. 2016) of relevant
national policy documentation and internet searches on ‘smart city’ or ‘future city’1 initia-
tives across the United Kingdom. The latter reflects the naming of the national Future Cities
Catapult centre, established by the government to support the development and implementa-
tion of smart city technology. Additionally, all six submitted bids for funding in the 2012
Future Cities Demonstrator competition, held by the Technology Strategy Board, the
national innovation agency supported by the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (see Taylor Buck and While 2015; Caprotti et al. 2016); Glasgow, as overall winner,
was awarded £24m to implement its plans, and Bristol, London, and Peterborough were each
awarded £3m as runners-up. Since this competition significantly catalysed all six cities’
smart activities, we treat their submitted ‘Feasibility Studies’ as key policy documents. As a
commonality, this competition also provides a basis for comparative research (Robinson
2011) exploring the variety of the ‘actually existing’ smart city (Shelton, Zook, and Wiig
2015) in the United Kingdom.
For each urban setting, the key policy strategies and all associated current and planned
activities were identified, and relevant publicly available documents were collected. Specific
activities were included if they were clearly linked to, or promoted within, the policy
documentation, and sought either to use digital technology to achieve particular goals or to
facilitate the use of digital technology. Beyond this, no further criteria (e.g. the centrality of
‘big data’) were imposed, given our desire to understand how the smart city has been
assembled contingently in practice. Table 1 lists the 68 activities thus identified and the
key associated policy documents, along with any overarching programmes of which parti-
cular activities formed a part, or local bodies (typically partnerships involving the council
among other actors) responsible for their delivery.2 The time frame for gathering this
documentation was April–June 2016, and those materials publicly available during this
period were included in the research.
Based on this set of documents, each of the 68 activities was then analysed individually.
First, through a protocol with four inter-related assemblage dimensions based on Newman
and Clarke’s (2009) discussion: (1) the issues which the activity or policy sought to address;
(2) the key actors involved in implementation; (3) the particular socio-technical practices
Urban Research & Practice 5
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involved; and (4) the variegated spatiality produced. And second, to identify the dominant
modality of publicness thus invoked: service user, entrepreneurial, political, or civic (as
discussed in the previous section).
By taking into account the linkages between individual activities and the wider policy
landscape, a profile of each smart city assemblage as a whole was built up. For the purposes
of triangulation, the results were aggregated following separate initial analyses and jointly
reviewed by the three authors. Finally, a transversal analysis was conducted across the six
cities, in order to identify common patterns as well as divergent practices.
Basing the analysis on detailed evidence has allowed for some of the variety across
particular locations to be captured, in partial response to Kitchin’s (2015) call to move
beyond critiques of the ‘place-less’ corporate and governmental promotional literature. Our
response is a partial one since, given the emergent nature of much smart city activity even in
these six locations, the research neither investigates practices of implementation in depth, nor
provides a long-term perspective on the smart city’s impact on the lived experience of the
city. The aim, rather, has been to investigate the outcomes of the processes whereby the
‘place-less’ smart city has been translated into locally specific projects, through the lens of
the documentation surrounding these.
The high-level findings reported below relate to our conclusions about the relative
prominence of different modalities of publicness. Although the discussion is illustrated
with particular examples of activity, space does not permit a thorough presentation of the
detailed elements of the six assemblages.3 Any of these elements can itself be seen as a
techno-public assemblage, and the analytical framework is offered as a tool for others
wishing to explore the public dimensions of current and future smart city activities at a
granular level.
4. Findings
4.1. The smart city in six municipal contexts: initial findings and observations
It is worth noting first that the policy documents analysed generally operate at the periphery
of traditional urban planning frameworks: local authorities are not formally obliged to
include smart city principles within statutory planning processes. Instead, these policies
are often championed by overarching strategy boards, economic development agencies, and
similar municipal bodies. As such, they typically seek to promote cohesive socio-economic
innovation policy to a range of actors both internally and externally for the purpose of
leveraging inward investment. Thus, they will have been shaped by their imagined reception
by varied audiences (Freeman and Maybin 2011, 163–164), rather than by the specific
intention that they should serve as traditional planning tools. The varying status of this
documentation is significantly reflective of the often opportunistic nature of smart city
activity, but also points to the often complicated governance arrangements in place.
Importantly, then, the relationship between the policy documents and activities shown in
Table 1 is not consistent across the six cities. For Glasgow, which presents itself as having
relatively straightforward governance arrangements, there is clear linearity between the plans
outlined in its 2012 Feasibility Study and the resulting initiatives. At the other end of the
spectrum, Manchester’s recent Smarter City Programme, for example, essentially collates a
series of activities already planned or taking place.
The activities themselves range from small-scale pilot scheme to major infrastructural
projects; from interventions into specific, spatially bounded areas to initiatives operating in
virtual space city-wide; from ‘top-down’ technological innovations to grass-roots
8 R. Cowley et al.
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community activities; and from one-off events to ongoing activities and services already
well-embedded into the urban fabric. Despite the identification in the academic literature,
then, of broad commonalities in variously conceived smart city ‘imaginaries’, its manifesta-
tions on the ground in the United Kingdom defy simple categorisation at first sight.
The policy documents also display noticeable city-specific inflections in their narrative
framings, reflecting the local contextual factors through which the translation of smart city
discourse into practical activity has been mediated. To provide some background for the
main analysis, an overview of the key framing principles in each city’s policy documents is
provided below, along with the varied governance structures that have emerged in dynamic
relationship with both the policy documents and the activities themselves. Such differences –
as will be discussed – help to explain some of the forms that local assemblages take, with
implications in turn for the nature of the publicness invoked.
4.1.1. Bristol
Bristol’s stated overall smart city goals are to expand the city’s knowledge economy, in a way
which furthers its image as a pioneer in environmental sustainability and a centre of grass-
roots innovation. Its 2012 Feasibility Study (Bristol City Council 2012) broadened the remit
of the earlier Smart City Bristol report (Bristol City Council 2011), which focused largely on
carbon emissions and transport issues, to develop a narrative of enabling environmentally
and socially sustainable growth at a time of economic expansion, in recognition of the city’s
significant health and wealth inequalities.
The council is one actor among many in Bristol’s current smart city activities, which are
not orchestrated by an overarching policy document. Nevertheless, the dual focus of its 2012
Feasibility Study, which proposed a mixture of ‘hard’ infrastructure and a parallel pro-
gramme of citizen engagement, resembles the two-stranded nature of what has emerged in
practice. The first strand, delivering digital infrastructure, is coordinated by the ‘Bristol is
Open’ partnership between the council and the University of Bristol, with support from other
private, public, and charitable organisations. The second collates various activities mostly
related to citizen and SME engagement, within the ‘Connecting Bristol’ initiative. Here, the
council’s role is more ‘hands-off’: specific activities are typically directly led by social
enterprises such as the Knowle West Media Centre.
4.1.2. Glasgow
As the overall winner of the Future Cities Demonstrator competition in 2012, Glasgow was
awarded £24m to implement its Feasibility Study proposals. Approximately half the award
(Davies 2014) was spent on a smart Operations Centre, fully operational since 2014, which
monitors real-time transport and public safety data. Meanwhile, a spread of smaller initia-
tives took place, many of which were participatory and interactive and were concluded (as
project deliverables) by the end of the TSB grant period.
Glasgow City Council clearly positions itself as the key driving force behind these
activities: the initiative is characterised by the absence of publicised collaborative partner-
ship. This may reflect the terms of the TSB award, positioning the City Council as the single
contractor and requiring rapid project implementation within the two-year schedule. Equally,
it upholds the principle asserted in the Feasibility Study that ‘smart cities are led from the top
by a strong and visionary champion’ (Glasgow City Council 2012, 5). Either way, the
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council’s centrality appears to have left Glasgow’s official smart city activities in a state of
suspension following the end of funding.
4.1.3. London
London’s foray into smart city innovation is explicitly linked to the opportunities and
challenges facing the UK’s capital as a global city: the smart city discourse deployed
forms an integral part of the overarching narrative of London striving for continuous growth
and consolidating its position as a leading international city (Mayor of London 2013; see also
NESTA 2015). The ‘Smart London’ initiative is primarily directed at forging a new
collaborative and entrepreneurial mode of governance, in the service of sustaining economic
growth to meet expected population growth. The Greater London Authority (GLA), and
particularly the office of the Mayor of London, is positioned at the centre of a wide range of
activities. It has co-opted a number of public and private actors, including leading research-
ers, tech companies, and larger utilities, mainly through the Smart London Board and
individual project partnerships. In promoting a co-creative governance mode for smart city
innovation, the GLA’s role is more to ‘steer’ than to direct outcomes.
4.1.4. Manchester
Manchester is building on a legacy of digital innovations, having published digital
strategies in 2008 and 2012, and previously established a Digital Development
Agency (MDDA) in 2003 (which was disbanded in 2015). Its 2012 Feasibility
Study framed its smart aspirations as potentially consolidating recent successes
including strong hi-tech industries, infrastructural investments, and repopulation of
the urban core. The ‘Defining vision’ of Manchester was presented as ‘the birthplace
of the industrial revolution re-inventing itself as a model of twenty-first century
“green growth”’ (Manchester City Council 2012, 8). The Feasibility Study was
taken as a starting point for an ongoing programme of smart activities in the
Oxford Road Corridor (Manchester City Council 2013), running 2 km south from
the city centre. Corridor Manchester, established as an incorporated body in 2007
(CAICT and PDSF 2014, 131), hopes that the district will continue to attract ‘knowl-
edge workers’ to become ‘one of the top five innovation districts in Europe’
(Corridor Manchester 2015, 4), achieving ‘local and global recognition as a place
that is original, creative, and smart, where knowledge is put to work’ (4).
Its smart city activities exhibit a particularly networked style of governance, with
the council just one of a series of actors allied in varying combinations – most
noticeably, the city’s universities and large hospitals, local engineering and hi-tech
firms, Transport for Greater Manchester, and grass-roots digital organisation Future
Everything. However, the council appears to have reclaimed a more central role
through its 2016 ‘Smarter City’ programme, which promotes activities from across
the city.
4.1.5. Milton Keynes
Milton Keynes consciously draws on its history of innovative urban planning and
technology deployment in stating the aim of becoming the UK’s ‘leading digital city’
(Milton Keynes Council 2012, 10), with an ‘unambiguous objective, backed with
10 R. Cowley et al.
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integrated city planning, to reduce its carbon footprint with an energy-efficient high-tech
knowledge’ (3). Although its 2012 Feasibility Study did not win funding, it has since
launched a ‘Future City’ programme, clearly framed by the goals of citizen co-creation
and environmental improvements.
Although universities typically play prominent partnership roles in other UK smart
city initiatives, Milton Keynes is unusual in that the Open University is the dominant
actor. This may be one reason why the MK: Smart programme strongly emphasises
citizen engagement as an end in itself, rather than – as is more the case in London and
Peterborough – a source of entrepreneurial ideas.
4.1.6. Peterborough
The smart activities taking place under the ‘Peterborough DNA’ programme, finally, are
clearly shaped by a green growth strategy. Peterborough aims to become the ‘Sustainability
Capital of the UK’, and as such ‘that “capital” will be exploited to the maximum to ensure
that it delivers true economic prosperity and well-being, through job creation and the
integration of employment, skills and innovation’ (Peterborough City Council 2012, 4).
The ‘fundamental goal’ of its smart activities is one of ‘growth, innovation, and sustain-
ability’ (Peterborough City Council 2014, 4).
As a runner-up in the TSB competition, Peterborough was awarded £3m. While its more
expensive proposals, including significant investment in the transport system, were not
funded, the four strands of its ‘DNA’ programme are similar to those proposed in its 2012
Feasibility Study: ‘smart business’, ‘living data’, ‘skills’, and ‘innovation’. In accordance
with the strong economic focus of the programme, Peterborough DNA is led collaboratively
by the council and the Local Economic Partnership ‘Opportunity Peterborough’.
4.2. The four modalities of publicness and their associated forms of assemblage
Despite the variety suggested above, some pertinent observations can be made about both
common tendencies and significant differences, in the types of publicness invoked by the
various smart city initatives across the six cities. As noted, we distinguish four modalities of
publicness, each of which correlates broadly with particular forms of assemblage.
4.2.1. Service-user publicness
What we term the ‘service user’modality of publicness relates the consumption of everyday
urban services: when, for example, a person travels by public transport, consumes water or
electricity, or uses broadband infrastructure. Smart technology offers the promise of poten-
tially enhancing such public interactions with service providers, by providing more accurate
or ‘real-time’ data for decision-making, new possibilities for users to contribute to services
through automated or voluntary feedback, and new channels of accountability.
By our assessment, this modality was dominant in 25 of the 68 activities analysed,
making it the most common form of publicness across the six cities as a whole. Examples of
relevant activities include Milton Keynes’ smart parking initiatives, the ‘Intelligent Street
Lighting’ and ‘Energy Efficiency Demonstrator’ pilots in Glasgow, and Manchester’s
‘Triangulum’ project, which aims to reduce energy use and improve local transport. Most
typically, such initiatives are characterised by relatively direct local council involvement.
The issues addressed vary, depending on the type of infrastructure in question, but transport
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congestion, resource consumption, carbon emissions, and digital inclusion are repeatedly
mentioned in the documentation. A commonality, then, is a normative framing in which the
goal of improved efficiency is highlighted.
Service user-oriented smart city projects are most typically associated with one type of
spatiality, relating to the traditional materiality of systems operating across the city: digital
technology serves to improve the functional efficiency of these existing systems. While,
then, the new technology may have clear spatial effects (e.g. in reworking traffic flows, or
recalibrating energy distribution), the spatialised phenomena to be rendered more efficient
are already present.
Crucially, this is the most passive of the four modalities identified. The public is
positioned as part of the city’s routine functionality, rather than assigned ‘co-creational’
agency. This, then, does not radically depart from the traditional relationship of the public to
infrastructural services. Of course, the provision of improved services does not contradict a
claim to being ‘citizen-centric’, or ‘putting people first’; its conceptualisation neither denies
nor acknowledges that publicness may be assembled otherwise.
4.2.2. Entrepreneurial publicness
If ‘service user’ publicness implies a relatively compliant, reactive collectivity, a more active
‘entrepreneurial’ sense of the public is conjured up in other activities which enrol citizens
into co-creating and innovating in the smart arena. This resonates with findings elsewhere
identifying a strong entrepreneurial governance mode at work in smart cities (e.g. Hollands
2015; Wiig 2015). The entrepreneurial modality relates less to the everyday functioning of
the city and more to the expectation that residents will be involved in creating services and
economic value. Rather than addressing particular thematic issues, it is framed by an unmet
need to harness the economic and service-related possibilities afforded by new digital
technologies and big data. We identified this modality as dominant for 19 of the 68 activities
considered.
Examples of related initiatives include the ‘hackathon’ events in several cities; the ‘Tech
Londoners’ initiative (aiming to bring ‘Londoners’ and entrepreneurs together to co-create
digital solutions to predefined problems); Peterborough’s ‘InnovationWeek’workshops and
‘Brainwave Innovation Portal’; and Manchester’s Digital Laboratory (‘MadLab’), which
encouraged local residents to find solutions to social problems through ‘co-creative, human-
centric and user-driven research, development and innovation’ (Ruijsink and Smith 2016, 4).
Bristol’s ‘IoTMesh’ scheme will ‘open-up the test-bed to a wide range of Internet-of-Things
(IoT) developers. In doing so, Bristol Is Open will enable companies to perfect their new
technology solutions for everything from smart rubbish bins to connected streetlamps and a
wide range of IoTsensors’ (Bristol is Open 2016b). The various ‘open data’ initiatives across
the cities serve directly to allow members of the public to make connections between the
datasets provided (and with their own data, if they wish). Public involvement in such
activities is often explicitly incentivised by commercial possibilities, and no clear conceptual
distinction is evident between the public sphere and the market. Glasgow’s ‘Open Data
Catalogue’, for example, promises to ‘empower everybody (the public, voluntary, academic,
private sectors, and communities) to harness [data], use it, and combine it in new ways. We
can all contribute to making Glasgow a better place to live, work, and play’ (Future City
Glasgow 2016b).
In some cases, such as hackathon events, the practices associated with this entrepre-
neurialism take place in traditional fora or make fairly conventional uses of internet sites (as
12 R. Cowley et al.
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in the case of Tech Londoners). But a more distinctively ‘smart’ spatiality may sometimes be
observed in the various attempts to add a ‘digital layer’ to the city, creating what might be
termed a ubiquitous network of connectivity. The digital infrastructure projects within the
Bristol is Open programme exemplify this spatiality particularly well; in a literal sense, they
will add a layer of digital connectivity to the city centre. The ‘Wireless Mile’, for example,
aims at the creation of a ‘heterogeneous technology environment’ (Bristol is Open 2016c: 1)
which integrates differently formatted wifi signals, such that ‘complex multi-layered net-
works of overlapping big and small cells supply smartphones, tablets, cars, drones and even
buildings, with a huge amount of cheap connectivity’ (Bristol is Open 2016d:2). The various
open data initiatives also fall into this category, insofar as they enable datasets about existing
services and amenities to be linked together.
Again, this invocation of entrepreneurial public agency sits comfortably with claims that
people are being put at the centre of smart city development: it explicitly invites public
contributions to the ongoing forms that this will take. However, like the service-user
modality, it says little about the more democratic dimensions of publicness. A more rounded
sense of ‘citizenship’, as traditionally conceived, encompasses not only ‘social rights’ (i.e.
access to services), but also ‘political rights’ (contributing to decision-making processes) and
‘civil’ ones (relating to freedom of speech) (Isin and Ruppert 2015). Accordingly, we further
propose and distinguish between, a ‘political’ and a ‘civic’ modality of publicness.
4.2.3. Political publicness
We use the label ‘political’ here in the narrow sense of public involvement in decision-
making and deliberation through institutional channels, or through novel extensions of these.
Examples include the ‘Talk London’ online platform, which hosts a mixture of surveys,
blogs, and discussion boards, promoting itself as a ‘place to discuss London’s big issues’
(Talk London 2016) and Bristol’s ‘Democratree’ app, which encouraged residents to nomi-
nate and vote on suitable locations for planting new trees. (While the latter was not initiated
directly by the council, it nevertheless provided a direct means for residents to influence
official decisions on resource allocation.) If there is a commonality in the issues addressed
through such activities, it relates to a perceived lack of participation – often with certain
social groups in mind – in local decision-making.
Overall, this is by far the least commonmodality of publicness invoked: it is dominant in
only three of the 68 activities considered. This is perhaps surprising, given that the potential
for digital technologies to reinvigorate democratic deliberation and decision-making has
been enthusiastically envisioned and debated since the 1990s (Isin and Ruppert 2015). The
lack of experimentation in this respect may partly be explained by the marginality of smart
city activities to traditional policy-making processes.
The uses of online fora (as in the case of the Talk London initiative), or voting apps
(Democratree), clearly depart from traditional modes of political deliberation – for example,
face-to-face settings – and yet nevertheless describe rather conventional uses of the internet.
However, there are too few examples in the set of activities analysed for us to draw
conclusions about the types of spatialities or spatial effects associated with this modality
of publicness.
We highlight the paucity of political publicness specifically because strategy documents
make repeated claims that citizen engagement is vital to the successful implementation of the
smart city and that related initiatives will enable wider citizen engagement with decision-
making processes. Its absence points more to a situation in which the smart city not only
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operates at the margins of normal institutional processes, but might even be critically
interpreted as seeking to bypass them – a possibility raised by Shearmur (2016) in recounting
how delegates at a technology conference imagined the public sector as merely an obstacle to
smart city implementation.
4.2.4. Civic publicness
Decision-making mediated through official processes only captures part of a city’s political
life and may tend to frame issues in certain ways for the purposes of voting or other forms of
deliberation. We therefore distinguish the ‘political’ from a rather less structured ‘civic’
modality of publicness, which loosely maps onto a traditional sense of the broader ‘public
sphere’. In other words, it inheres in those activities taking place in spaces beyond state
institutions, but which are not directly oriented towards market activity. A local council’s
involvement in such activities is necessarily more at arm’s length: it may enable or merely
approve of such activities in its own promotional documents. The types of issues shaping its
assemblage should, then, emerge ‘from below’. Equally, however, this modality of public-
ness may be more immediately associated with leisure activities or ‘playfulness’ – such
activities in public space may constitute a performative type of claim making within the
broader democratic process (see e.g. Hou 2010; Parkinson 2012). The invocation of civic
publicness is far from uncommon across the six cities considered here: on a par with the
entrepreneurial, it is dominant for 21 of the 68 activities (and the most common modality in
London).
Examples include the ‘Community Wellness’ strand of Manchester’s ‘CityVerve’ pro-
ject, aiming to encourage schoolchildren and commuters to take exercise in parks; Bristol’s
‘MyKW’ community social media platform, the ‘Bristol Approach to Citizen Sensing’, and
‘Playable City’ initiatives; Glasgow’s ‘Active Travel’ demonstrator initiative, insofar as it
encouraged cyclists to share data and experiences of cycling in the city; and London’s ‘Speed
Volunteering’ app, which seeks to put those wishing to volunteer in touch with people
seeking help.
We discern two distinctive spatialities as characteristic of assemblages of civic public-
ness. First, relevant initiatives are often constituted by the goal of manifesting the virtual/
digital in traditional (physical) public space. Peterborough, for example, has planned a large
‘OpenCity’ digital screen in the city centre. Bristol’s ‘Playable Cities’ competition has been
running annually since 2013, to fund temporary artistic installations in the city centre. The
project, also taking place elsewhere internationally, aims to put ‘people and play at the heart
of the future city . . . Through interaction and creative installations, it unlocks a social
dialogue, bringing the citizens into a city development conversation’ (Watershed 2016).
Examples have included the 2013 winner Hello Lamp Post, which allowed members of the
public to have text message conversations with various items of street furniture; and
Urbanimals in 2015, in which digitally projected animals would appear unexpectedly across
the city and interact with the public (Watershed 2016). Manchester’s ‘CityVerve’ Internet of
Things demonstrator project, mentioned above, plans to install ‘talkative bus stops’, and a
‘Community Wellness’ sensor network in parks along school and commuter routes to
encourage exercise (UK Government 2015).
The second characteristic spatiality of civic publicness relates to varied attempts to
reclaim the digital sphere from the private sector. The idea of ‘reclamation’ may not be
explicit in the documentation, but such initiatives are typically driven by civil society actors
and aim variously to empower citizens to use and have a presence through new digital urban
14 R. Cowley et al.
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technologies. Manchester’s ‘Living Lab’ programme (whose current status is unclear,
following the disbandment of the Manchester Digital Development Authority) included
the development of an interactive local news and information web portal, featuring content
created by residents. The ‘Manchester Digital Laboratory’ describes itself as a ‘grassroots
innovation organisation’ (MadLab 2016a) which organises various events and digital train-
ing courses, with a core mission to allow the general public to ‘help people to make things
better, together’, through ‘experimentation’, ‘play’ and ‘fun’, and the promotion of craftman-
ship (MadLab 2016b). In Bristol, a local social networking site (first trialled as ‘MyKW’ in
the Knowle West district) has been extended to the city as a whole (as ‘MyBristol’). The
planned ‘Bristol Approach to Citizen Sensing’ initiative, meanwhile, mentioned above, most
explicitly displays the aim of reconfiguring virtual space in this way, in its vision of a ‘co-
created city commons’ which ‘supports the deployment of new or adapted technologies into
everyday environments’ (KWMC 2016, 1).
4.2.5. Summary of relative prominence of different modalities of publicness
Table 2 summarises the relative prominence of the four modalities of publicness, in each
city and across all six cities.
Analysing these data too closely would potentially yield spurious findings, for several
reasons: our six cities were not chosen to yield a somehow statistically representative sample
of activities for the purposes of quantitative research; the coding of their modalities involved
some subjective judgement; and all activities are equally weighted regardless of scale, time
period, budget, and policy significance. These reservations aside, the findings provide an
indicative overview of the variations in the publicness assembled in these six leading cities;
and in this spirit, two broad observations are ventured.
First, the relative prominence of the four modalities differs considerably by city. In this
sense, again, ‘smart publicness’, is evidently not determined by globally circulating dis-
courses, but at least partly reflects its immediate governance and policy context. The relative
absence of entrepreneurial publicness in Glasgow, for example, communicates the council’s
sole responsibility for delivering activities. In Bristol, the dominant entrepreneurial and civic
modalities chime with an overall strategic goal of expanding the knowledge economy by
tapping into a strong tradition of grass-roots innovation. The lack of service-user publicness
in Peterborough reflects the limited funding available for hard infrastructural projects; the
emphasis on entrepreneurial and civic publicness evinces the shared responsibility of the
city’s economic development agency and the council in managing the Peterborough DNA
programme. London’s relatively weak service use focus, differently, confirms the GLA’s role
as steering and advisory actor, rather than as funder of large-scale material interventions. The
city-level assemblages in Manchester and Milton Keynes display similarity in their strong
overall service-use sense of publicness and relatively weak civic modality. While civic
publicness may come to the fore in Manchester in future, given Corridor Manchester’s stated
‘place-making’ goals (Corridor Manchester 2015, 24–25), its current relative absence
implies a lack of active engagement on the part of the general public. Milton Keynes is
perhaps more surprising in this respect, given its clear strategic claim to be civically engaged.
Its relatively weak civic publicness underlines the opportunistic nature of smart urban
activities: those coming to be implemented or funded may reflect strategic goals unevenly;
smart policy documents themselves carry relatively little weight in the urban development
process.
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Second, the proportion of initiatives oriented towards civic publicness is not insig-
nificant: these account for approximately a third of all the activities examined. On this
basis, it would be oversimplistic to dismiss the claims that the ‘actually existing’
contemporary UK smart city pays only lip service to the importance of public claim-
making. Nevertheless, this embrace of the democratic process does not extend to the
provision of significant opportunities for citizens to engage directly with the formal
political system in innovative ways. In itself, the absence of envisaged political public-
ness does not undermine the possibility of more traditional public engagement with
governmental institutions elsewhere; yet, the smart city does not provide channels for the
direct expression of public contestation or more radical forms of dissent.
In this sense, the smart city may appear to be aligned with broader depoliticising or ‘post-
political’ tendencies in governance generally and urban planning specifically (Swyngedouw
2007, 2011; Allmendinger and Haughton 2012; Joss 2015). In a post-political reading, its
assemblage across UK cities would reflect the nature of its conceptual underpinnings: the
smart city can only ‘command agreement as a result of [its] broadly progressive if non-
specific framing’ (Allmendinger and Haughton 2012, 94) and is therefore ‘unable to arouse
conflicts among political ideas’ (Crivello 2015, 919). Alternatively, following Newman and
Clarke (2009), it illustrates the apparent paradox of the decline of the traditional ‘public’
being accompanied by its simultaneous proliferation as a fragmented mulitiplicity: political
publicness may be assembling elsewhere, but is not associated with the intended role of the
smart city in the United Kingdom.
4.2.6. Obduracy
Political publicness aside, our findings have at least provided convincing evidence that UK
smart city initiatives are guided by a genuine desire to encourage civic engagement of
various kinds. Even here, however, a more nuanced picture emerges when the relative
obduracy of individual activities is factored in. Based on the available information, we
flagged each of the 68 activities as either ‘permanent’ (to indicate ongoing operation or
presence in the city) or ‘temporary’ (to indicate a one-off or time-limited activity). As Table 3
shows, civic (and political) activities tend to be less permanent in nature than those invoking
entrepreneurial and service-user publicness.
In an important sense, the relatively temporary nature of activities oriented towards
political and civic publicness is unsurprising, particularly when contrasted with the service-
user modality, which is more often associated – as discussed above – with ‘hard’ infra-
structural interventions. The consequences of such activities may be long-lasting, even when
the activity itself is short-lived. Nevertheless, these findings fall short of convincingly
heralding a situation in which citizenship is prioritised as the central ongoing concern of
the UK smart city.
Table 3. Obduracy of smart city activities invoking each modality of publicness.
Dominant modality
Permanent
%
Temporary
% Base (number of activities)
Service-user 76 24 (25)
Entrepreneurial 58 42 (19)
Political 33 67 (3)
Civic 48 52 (21)
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Significantly, furthermore, a degree of bifurcation is evident in the overall techno-public
assemblages, such that civic and political publicness are sidelined within less obdurate
strands of programmatic activity. In Glasgow, the enduring legacy of the ‘Future City’
programme is most visible in the service-user-oriented Operation Centre. However, many
of its other activities characterised by a more interactive and participatory mode of public
engagement were one-off events. As ‘demonstrator projects’, they served in principle to help
define, rather than enact, the smart city – but there is little evidence that this more temporary
strand of the ‘Future City’ programme has subsequently been embedded in mainstream
municipal activities. In Bristol, too, a clear bifurcation is evident. On one side, the ‘Bristol is
Open’ improvements to the city’s digital infrastructure and the ‘Open Data Bristol’ initiative
(all of which might be expected to be relatively durable) invoke primarily entrepreneurial
publicness. On the other, the Connecting Bristol partnership promotes diverse ‘softer’ civic
and political activities, led by grass-roots organisations, which exhibit rather less obduracy as
small-scale pilot schemes or activities with limited public participation. Evidently, then, less
commitment and resources are available for experiments in the field of citizenship, under-
stood in more traditional liberal democratic ways, than in those which conjure up a passive or
entrepreneurial public.
5. Discussion
Our reading of the smart city consciously departs from critical presentations of the smart city
as a ‘top-down’ imposition, and towards a foregrounding, and more nuanced appreciation, of
its practical variety. But the observation that this variety is skewed towards the assemblage of
service-user and entrepreneurial senses of the public does not constitute a straightforwardly
useful critique of its current local manifestations. The focus on service-user publicness, at
least, is unsurprising to the extent that local authorities are arguably seen by default as
primarily service providers. To observe that civic and political publicness, by way of
contrast, are less well considered, and often only tokenistically accommodated, is not to
make the normative case that these should necessarily, or could realistically, be privileged in
local techno-public smart assemblages. Rather, the prevalence of this more passive modality
of publicness becomes significant when set against rhetorical claims that the smart city is
effecting transformational ‘citizen-centric’ change
The dominance of service-user publicness does little to counter a broader trend identified
by Powell (2014, 15) towards ‘a shift in the notion of citizenship . . . away from civic
responsibilities and engagements, to classifying [citizens] as consumers who purchase
services from providers’. Although Powell’s discussion relates to the role of digitised data
more generally, it is clearly relevant to the smart city’s focus on providing greater efficien-
cies. Insofar as the ‘relationship between government individuals and corporate entities’ (15)
is viewed through the lens of the ‘citizen as consumer’, its quality is only improved by the
efficiencies which datafication enables. Citizenship, in this narrow sense, is not related to
altruism or responsibilities, but rather based on a principle of exchange, and enacted through
‘collecting and sharing personal data’ (15). Drawing on Dean (2005), Powell highlights the
risk that ‘the norms of publicity – information, communication, and participation – have
come to stand for the political ends that they were presumed to serve’ (Powell 2014, 16). This
perspective raises various questions about many of the goals of UK smart city initiatives in
relation to the broader dimensions of citizenship. For example, the aim of ‘digital inclusion’,
commonly asserted among these six cases, may appear laudable, and yet it pushes the deeper
purpose of digital inclusion into the background: smart connectivity itself becomes the goal.
18 R. Cowley et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [9
2.1
.16
6.7
2]
 at
 01
:13
 06
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
Similarly, ideals of ‘transparent governance’ or ‘open data’ may end up being fetishised
within a discourse of efficiency, even though this discourse tells us little about the normative
basis of the relationship between the public and the state, beyond its passive ‘service-user’
modality.
Although, again, our analysis opposes the existence of a deterministic link between
global smart discourse and local practices, the focus on efficiency of different types
(including resource use, provision of services, and access to information) clearly resonates
with White’s (2016) identification of an international discursive storyline in which the smart
city responds to ‘resource pressures brought on by rapid urbanization and an ageing popula-
tion, the effects of anthropogenic global climate change, and the twinned pressure of fiscal
austerity and inter-urban competition’ (577). We would at least suggest that the narrative of
the ‘age of crisis’ which accompanies much of the contemporary envisionment of future
cities (Caprotti 2015) has had a shaping influence on the prominence given to efficient
service provision in smart activities implemented to date.
Equally, given the broader UK policy context, it would seem eccentric for local autho-
rities to discourage entrepreneurialism. On the immediate pragmatic level of funding and
resources, it must be significant that the government’s Department for Business, Skills, and
Innovation has played a significant catalytic role: smart city initiatives have not emerged
under the auspices of, say, the Department for Communities and Local Government. But the
prominence of entrepreneurial publicness raises a separate set of concerns, echoing Datta’s
(2015) diagnosis – albeit with reference to the rather different context of the Indian city of
Dholera – of the smart city promoting ‘urbanization as a business model rather than a model
of social justice’. Across our UK cases, issues of social sustainability are far from absent in
policy documents, but their range tends to be limited, for example, focusing on health and
e-inclusion, or educating residents to participate in the digital economy. In Glasgow, such
questions are subsumed within overall questions of efficiency and relate to very specific
factors such as public safety and reporting problems with services. Milton Keynes claims
considerable interest in citizen co-creation, but its initiatives are not primarily aimed at
targeting social problems. Although Peterborough’s 2012 Feasibility Study prominently
flagged up inequalities, social cohesion, and health improvements among other issues
(Peterborough City Council 2012, 3), its current strategy is addressed towards developing
skills which ‘meet local business demand’ and ‘put Peterborough’ in ‘the best possible
position to take advantage of emerging markets’ (Peterborough City Council 2014, 5).
One final way in which the ‘citizen-centric’ nature of the UK smart city is questionable
relates to an apparent straightforward lack of public interest. On one level, this simply
reminds us of the peripherality of the smart city: many of the associated activities only claim
to be small-scale experimental trials and are not deeply embedded into the mainstream policy
process. While the actual numbers of local residents involved with many civic and political
schemes are often negligible, we found no convincing evidence either of broader enthusiasm
or emergent public counter-discourse in any city.4 While emergent political or civic con-
testation is clearly not something which local authorities might ‘plan’ for – it would be
absurd to expect local authorities to devise problems for frustrated publics to assemble
around – its absence does not provide evidence of acquiescence or approval, or guarantee the
smooth passage of smart technology into urban life more broadly in future. It more obviously
reflects the survey evidence suggesting that general public awareness of any ‘smart’ plans or
activities undertaken by local councils is neglible (Arqiva 2015) and that only one in five UK
adults even recognises the term smart city (IET 2016).
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6. Conclusions: towards a new ‘smart urban publicness’?
In studying and comparing a series of relatively well-developed smart city programmes as
‘techno-public assemblages’, we have responded to a series of policy claims made about the
relationships between smart urban technologies and the public. Our analysis reveals that the
publicness envisaged and enacted in the UK smart city is far from one-dimensional. Citizens
are not merely absent, as the earlier critiques of the smart city would have it, nor do smart city
activities necessarily invoke a particular, stunted notion of publicness in all cases. Rather, the
great variety of types of publicness in evidence leads us to conclude that the rhetorical claims
about the smart city being citizen-centric are not straightforwardly empty ones. Rather than
agreeing with the speculative critiques of the smart city as a devious attempt to exclude the
public, we would urge commentators to begin from the assumption that its institutional
protagonists do have a vested interest in questions of democracy.
That said, it also seems fair to conclude that the smart does not yet evince a convincingly
rounded sense of the ‘public city’. The opportunistic nature of smart city development, in
other words, gives rise to unique local forms, but simultaneously holds these hostage to
broader societal and economic agendas; the forms of their assemblage have remained shaped
by immediate policy contexts and broader smart city policy discourse. Thinking in terms of
its experimental, shifting and peripheral assemblage in practice nevertheless opens up
agentive space for actors involved to influence smart development in ways which more
convincingly invoke a more rounded sense of publicness and, in turn, enable a more
convincing sense of public ownership and enthusiasm.
For more fully public smart city assemblages to emerge in future, the civic and political
may need to be more obviously accommodated within the service-user and entrepreneurial.
This need not relate to heavy-handed attempts to co-opt the civic, which risk neutralising its
innovative potential, but the civic should at least not be siloed into more ephemeral strands of
activity. A lack of civic engagement with large infrastructural projects, for example, seems
unlikely to be successfully mitigated by a series of parallel participatory events which pass
unnoticed by most residents. Similarly, entrepreneurial activities are to be welcomed which
are more obviously oriented towards finding solutions to problems defined by citizens,
alongside those oriented at the creation of wealth through hi-tech innovations. The possibi-
lities for smart city technology to enable or engender more formal political participation,
furthermore, appear to have remained largely unexplored in practical terms.
If only because the ‘actually existing’ smart city is still at an experimental stage of
development, we note that it has effected only marginal reconfigurations of the material
spaces of the city to date. Nevertheless, looking forward, we urge researchers and practi-
tioners to pay attention to the distinctive spatialities of the ‘smart public’, particularly in the
interfaces between public and private space, and between virtual space and the traditional
material public realm. There is considerable scope in this regard to reverse the tendency,
identified by Kinsley (2013), to assign the digital to a parallel, disembodied ‘hyperspace’;
rather, our understandings might more fruitfully be grounded in the relationships between
humans and technology in local contexts. For policy-makers and practitioners actively
seeking a more widespread and involved sense of public debate around, and engagement
with, the implications of smart technology, it may be rewarding to focus on the visibility of
new innovations. This may involve moving towards a more active consideration of the
multiple roles of public space and more imaginatively using smart technologies to move
away from more traditional fora as spaces of public engagement.
Overall, we resist from concluding that contemporary UK smart initiatives already
constitute a qualitatively novel recasting of the public. In relying on dominant political
20 R. Cowley et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [9
2.1
.16
6.7
2]
 at
 01
:13
 06
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
structures and economic actors, they have come to promote incremental change at best, both
in terms of publicness and the material space of the city. But assessing the long-term
impacts of smart innovations on urban space will be an ongoing project; indeed, the concept
‘smart’ itself may in future lose currency as a label or be reworked as a signifier. In the
meantime, insofar as the smart city is indicative of broader contemporary attempts to shape
urban change in a time of austerity, its ‘experimental’ nature may appear rather more
problematically reflective of a bypassing of the traditional democratic process. And if we
too may be allowed to propose a dystopian scenario, it is one where, in spite of the best
intentions of policy-makers, the dominant norms of emerging smart city practices become
sedimented into novel twenty-first century institutional processes whose pragmatic world-
view does not extend beyond that of a society of entrepreneurs and service users.
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Notes
1. The two terms (‘smart city’, ‘future city’) are complementary and often used interchangeably,
especially in the UK national policy context (see e.g. BSI 2014, 3; also; Joss, Cook, and
Dayot, forthcoming). It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve into the conceptual
interrelationship of these recent policy terms in more detail.
2. A fuller list of the key documents and links to relevant web pages consulted has been made
publicly available on the lead author’s ResearchGate web pages: https://www.researchgate.net/
profile/Robert_Cowley.
3. More detailed descriptions of many of the individual activities and bodies analysed in the
present research may be found in the ‘grey literature’ (see e.g. Caprotti et al. 2016; Woods
et al. 2016).
4. With the exception of some concerns in Glasgow about the use of facial recognition software
in the city’s CCTV system, linked to the Operation Centre (Sunday Herald 2014; Aitchinson
2015).
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